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THE FCC'S REPORT ON REGULATING
BROADCAST VIOLENCE: IS THE MEDIUM THE
MESSAGE?
Faith M. Sparr*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been said about the Federal Communication Commission's
("FCC") recent report addressing whether Congress can constitutionally
regulate broadcast television violence.' Some have noted that the report
was cursory in nature, especially in light of the fact that Congress asked
specific questions when requesting the report which seemed to go largely
unanswered.2 Others argue that the main purpose in releasing the report is
to prod television executives to alter programming-that neither the FCC
nor Congress has the inclination or political will to truly regulate violence
on television.3 It remains to be seen whether the political will exists to
implement the most restrictive FCC recommendation, content channeling.4
Congressional bills attempting to confront this issue have been drafted in
the past,5 and at least one senator has indicated that he will use the report to
* Lecturer of Communication Studies at the University of
Michigan; J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, 22 F.C.C.R.
7929 (2007). See, e.g., Online Symposium for TV Violence & the FCC,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/collection.aspx?item=TV-violence-FCC (last visited Oct.
10, 2007).
2. See Robert Com-Revere, FCC Television Violence Report: A Conclusion in Search
of an Analysis, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 27, 2007,
http://wwfirstamendmentcenter.orgcommentary.aspx?id=18493.
3. See Majorie Heins, Politics of TV Violence Returns to Center Stage: FCC's TV-Violence
Report, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 29, 2007,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=18498.
4. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1.
5. See, e.g., Craig R. Smith, Violence & Media Overview, available at
http://wwwfirstamendmentcenter.org/speechlarts/topic.aspx?topic=violencemedia (last visited
Oct. 10, 2007) (describing several Congressional bills aimed at regulating television broadcast
violence).
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introduce legislation regulating violence.6 What is certain, as is always the
case when Congress steps so firmly into the First Amendment arena, is that
the courts will be left to sort the constitutional laundry.7 This is why the
report's short shrift of the constitutional issues and jurisprudential history is
surprising. The report's treatment of the research regarding the effect of
violent media on minors and the FCC's suggestions for a definition of
violence are equally brief and unpersuasive. Furthermore, the report's
almost total reliance on one case, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,8 leaves a
gaping jurisprudential hole in its legal analysis.
This Article examines the legal questions left unanswered in the
FCC's report. For instance, is a court examining the constitutionality of
broadcast violence regulations likely to rely primarily on Pacifica, or will
other cases examining content regulations in different mediums be included
in the court's analysis? Of course, Pacifica is highly relevant in the
equation, given that it directly addresses the broadcast medium, but the
content to be regulated under the FCC's new proposal is obviously
different. 9 Pacifica specifically deals with regulating indecency, while the
FCC's report deals with regulating violence-begging the question of
whether the medium or the content is most relevant in a constitutional
analysis. 10  If the latter is the answer, proponents of the channeling
legislation will arguably lose the constitutional battle. However, if the
medium really is the message, these warriors may have cause for hope.
II. THE FCC REPORT
The FCC's report, In the Matter of Violent Television Programming
and Its Impact on Children ("Report"), was adopted by the Commission on
6. See Associated Press, Government Must Act to Curb TV Violence Says Sen. Rockefeller
(June 27, 2007), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/newslaspx?id=18727 (Senator
Jay Rockefeller stated that he would push for legislation to regulate violent media content, in
response to the FCC's report.).
7. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
8. Id.
9. See id.; In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children,
supra note 1.
10. While the Supreme Court has noted that "[e]ach medium of expression... may present
its own problems" (Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)), the Court has also
focused heavily on the type of content to be regulated. For instance, the Supreme Court has
established several categories of unprotected speech. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
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April 6, 2007 and released to the public on April 25, 2007.1 The FCC
issued the Report in response to a letter from thirty-nine House members to
former FCC chair Michael Powell.12 The letter asked the FCC to conduct a
review of television violence, and more specifically requested the FCC
answer the following questions:
1)What are the negative effects on children caused by the
cumulative viewing of excessively violent programming?
2)What are the constitutional limits on the government's ability
to restrict the broadcast of excessively violent programming
when children are likely to be a significant or substantial part of
the viewing audience? In particular, could television violence
regulations, including possible time channeling requirements, be
narrowly tailored to the governmental interests they are intended
to serve?
3)Is it in the public interest for the government to adopt a
definition of "excessively violent programming that is harmful
to children," and could the government formulate and
implement such a definition in a constitutional manner?
3
The Report is organized around these three questions, with a separate
section devoted to the exploration of each. Though this Article will focus
mainly on the second question posed by the House members, it is worth
discussing the FCC's analysis of the first and third inquiries as well.
A. Social Scientific Evidence
There is no shortage of debate among social scientists regarding
whether violent media content has a specific, measurable, negative effect
on children.14 In addition, numerous law review articles have been written
on the subject.' 5  The debated question is closely linked to the
constitutionality of any regulation aimed at limiting television violence in
light of Judge Posner's opinion in American Amusement Machine v.
11. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1.
12. Id. at 2 3.
13. Id. at 2-3 4.
14. See id. at3 6n. 10.
15. See, e.g., Kevin W. Saunders, The Cost of Errors in the Debate Over Media Harm to
Children, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 771 (2005); Scott A. Pyle, Is Violence Really Just Fun and
Games?: A Proposal for a Violent Video Game Ordinance that Passes Constitutional Muster, 37
VAL. U.L. REv. 429 (2002); Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427 (2000).
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Kendrick,16 discussed later in this Article. The Report duly notes the
tension amongst some scholars on this issue, 17 but concludes "that, on
balance, research provides strong evidence that exposure to violence in the
media can increase aggressive behavior in children, at least in the short
term."
1 8
The FCC's analysis of the research is somewhat cursory, with most of
the pertinent analysis in the Report's footnotes which cite many studies on
the issue.' 9 Most of these studies, however, are not fully explored in either
the text or footnotes. 20 The Report discusses a few studies which found
that violent programming in fact had an effect, or tended to be associated
with an effect, on children's behavior or their perception of the world.21
One study conducted by Dr. Craig Anderson concluded that "exposure to
media violence [movies, television, music, and video games] has a
statistically significant association with aggression and violence among
youth.' 22 However, Dr. Anderson also noted that personal characteristics
of the viewer can "influence the degree to which media violence affects
aggression. 23
Another researcher whose work is specifically discussed in the Report
is Professor Joanne Cantor. Based on her findings, she concluded that
"children show higher levels of hostility after exposure to media violence-
ranging from being in a 'nasty mood' to an increased tendency to interpret
a neutral comment or action as an attack., 2 4 Further, longitudinal research
has shown that a child's habitual exposure to television violence at an early
age is more predictive of increased aggression in later life, irrespective of
other factors such as intellect or social status.
The Report notes that while some of the research may show a
correlation between viewing violent media and aggressive behavior, the
research is not conclusive with respect to whether the violent content
actually causes such behavior.26 In exploring this distinction, the Report
16. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
17. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at6 10.
18. Id. at 3 6.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4 8.
22. Id. at 4-5 8,n. 16.
23. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 5 8.
24. Id. at 5 9.
25. Id. at 7 13.
26. Id.
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cites the Federal Trade Commission's report on Marketing Violent
Entertainment to Children,27 which concluded that "[m]ost researchers and
investigators agree that exposure to media violence alone does not cause a
child to commit a violent act, and that it is not the sole, or even necessarily
the most important, factor contributing to youth aggression, anti-social
attitudes, and violence., 28  Furthermore, citing the Surgeon General's
report, Youth Violence,2 9 the Report notes that the research so far cannot
"describe accurately how much exposure, of what types, for how long, at
what ages, for what types of children, or in what types of settings will
predict violent behavior in adolescents and adults. 3 °
The FCC also gives cursory treatment to the critics of the studies
drawing a link between violent content and harmful effects on children.
The Report notes the various criticisms, but does not attempt to address the
questions posed by the critics. 31 Furthermore, the Report does not provide
any of the refutations offered by the authors whose studies are being
criticized.32 For instance, Professor Michael Males at the University of
California Santa Cruz suggests a number of problems with the studies
linking violent media with children's aggression.33 First, Males argues that
studies showing a statistically significant result is not proof of causality but
only that the result is not likely to happen by chance.34 Second, he suggests
that the studies themselves are extremely inconsistent because they all use
vastly different examples of violence. 35  Third, he believes that the
nonviolent clips shown in many experiments are not equivalent to the
violent clips shown with respect to many variables, such as the level of
interest the children will have in the clips.36 Lastly, he argues that the
researchers use completely different examples or indicators of what
27. FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN (2000).
28. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 6 10 (quoting FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN, at Appendix A
(2000)).
29. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (Nov. 2001).
30. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 7 12 (quoting DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, at Appendix 4-B (Nov. 2001)).
31. See In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra
note 1.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 10 18.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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constitutes violence or aggressive behavior in children.37
There may be legitimate explanations for Males' concerns, but the
Report does not provide them, nor does it refer the reader to other
researchers who may have addressed the issues raised by Males. As a
result, the Report's answer to the first question posed by the House
members is conclusory and lacks thoughtful analysis. After breezing
through the studies supporting a link between violent media and aggressive
behavior in children, then noting the various criticisms of such studies, the
Report simply concludes:
Given the totality of the record before us, we agree with the
view of the Surgeon General that: "a diverse body of research
provides strong evidence that exposure to violence in the media
can increase children's aggressive behavior in the short term."
At the same time, we do recognize that "many questions remain
regarding the short- and long-term effects of media violence,
especially on violent behavior." We note that a significant
number of health professionals, parents and members of the
general public are concerned about television violence and its
effects on children.38
B. Definition of Violence
The FCC's attempt to provide guidance on the definition of
"excessively violent programming harmful to children" is not very
instructive. 39 The definition established by legislation could be crucial to
its success or failure on a constitutional level. In particular, an overbroad
definition could lead to the legislation failing a strict or an intermediate
scrutiny test for restricting more speech than necessary.40 Indeed, far from
providing clarity, the FCC suggests that the legislation might use different
definitions for excessively violent programming depending on what the
37. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 10 18.
38. Id. at 10-11 20 (quoting DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at Appendix 4-B (Nov. 2001)).
39. Id. at 18-21.
40. The Supreme Court has held that content-based speech restrictions will be subject to a
strict scrutiny standard typically requiring a compelling government interest be shown, and that
the restriction be narrowly tailored to further that interest. See United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 802, 813 (2000). Content-neutral speech restrictions are typically analyzed
under an intermediate scrutiny test, requiring only an important or substantial government interest
and a less burdensome requirement with respect to tailoring. See also Am. Amusement Mach.
Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 578.
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regulation prohibits.4I For instance, the Report notes that defining
excessively violent programming for the mere purpose of content ratings
might not require the content be defined or described as having a likelihood
of harm to children. 42 As opposed to this somewhat loose definition, the
FCC suggests that a more narrow definition would be needed for a
mandatory channeling provision.43
Furthermore, the Report explains that any definition of violence must
be sufficiently clear to provide ample notice to broadcasters regarding the
possibility of running afoul of the regulation.44 This is easier said than
done. The FCC has a history of expanding its reach within the realm of
indecency, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently vacated the
FCC's revised "fleeting expletives" policy.45  Thus, it is unlikely that
broadcasters would have a notion of either Congress' or the FCC's
intended scope of excessively violent programming. The FCC also briefly
notes that any such definition would have to consider the context of the
broadcast, similar to the Supreme Court's obscenity test in Miller,46 which
exempts material that has "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value" from the definition of obscenity.47 However, the Report argues,
somewhat inconsistently, that the overall value of the broadcast does not
change the impact of certain words or phrases on children.48
The Report does provide some specific suggestions for a definition,
noting that the National Television Violence Study defines violence as
"any overt depiction of a credible threat of physical force or the actual use
of such force intended to physically harm an animate being or group of
beings. 49  Another definition the Report cites is from Morality in the
Media which defines violence as "intense, rough or injurious use of
41. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 18 39.
42. Id. at 18 39.
43. Id. at 18, 20 39 & 44.
44. Id. at 18 40.
45. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), that the FCC's revised fleeting expletives policy was arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. For further discussion of the expansion
of the FCC's indecency policy over the years, including the fleeting expletives revision, see Faith
M. Sparr, From Carlin's Seven Dirty Words to Bono's One Dirty Word: A Look at the FCC's
Ever-Expanding Indecency Enforcement Role, 3 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 271 (2005).
46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
47. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 18 40.
48. Id. at 19 40.
49. Id. at 19 42 (quoting CENTER FOR COMMUNICATION & SOCIAL POLICY, NATIONAL
TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY VOLUME 3 (Joel Federman ed., 1998)).
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physical force or treatment either recklessly or with an apparent intent to
harm. 50
Ultimately, the FCC does not endorse any particular definition.
Instead, the Report simply notes various factors that would need to be
considered and brushes aside criticisms that violence in various programs
serves different purposes and no definition could possibly account for these
differences.51
C. The FCC's Constitutional Analysis
Given that the FCC only provides a cursory look at the first and third
questions the House members requested it to answer, it should be no
surprise that its analysis of the legal issues is similarly brief and superficial.
Of primary interest is the Report's almost sole reliance on FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.52  Accordingly, in a medium versus message paradigm, it
seems the FCC is heavily focused on the medium.
The Report quotes the Supreme Court's language in Pacifica that
"each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems"
and that broadcast has typically received "the most limited First
Amendment protection. '53 Additionally, the FCC's analysis concludes that
in examining the constitutionality of any broadcast violence regulation, a
court would not apply a strict scrutiny analysis, but instead should apply a
more lenient intermediate scrutiny test.
54
Despite its claim that strict scrutiny does not apply to broadcast
speech regulation,55 the FCC characterizes the government's interests in
regulating violent material as "compelling., 56  Historically, this type of
language is reserved for the interest the government must demonstrate
under a strict scrutiny analysis. 7 The Report uses this language both to
describe what it believes is the compelling government interest in this
50. Id. at 20 42.
51. Id. at 20 143.
52. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Pacifica involved a local radio program's
broadcast of George Carlin's Filthy Words monologue at a time of day where children would
likely be in the audience. A member of the public heard the show while in the car with his young
son and filed a complaint with the FCC. The Supreme Court examined many issues in the case,
one being whether the FCC could constitutionally regulate indecent speech over broadcast
airwaves.
53. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
I at 11 22 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744 (internal quotations omitted)).
54. Id. at 11 22-25.
55. Id. at 11122.
56. Id. at I I 22-37.
57. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1065 (1996).
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case-shielding kids from violent material based on the studies it
referenced earlier in its report-and in citing what the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found to be a compelling government interest in upholding some
of the FCC's indecency regulatory scheme in Action for Children's
Television v. FCC.
58
In fact, the Report only briefly addresses the important distinction that
the content at issue here is different than the indecent material the Supreme
Court in Pacifca allowed the FCC to regulate. 59 The Report relies on
comments submitted during the public comment period by Pappas
Telecasting Companies and states that a regulation would pass
constitutional muster because the interests motivating the regulations are
the same.60  The FCC does not, however, address or mention Judge
Posner's opinion in American Amusement Machine,61 wherein the analysis
focused heavily on the difference between sexually explicit content and
violent content.62
In further support of its conclusion that violent content on broadcast
television can be constitutionally regulated, the FCC appears to rely on the
premise that violent content is simply not all that important. In particular,
the FCC quotes language from Pacifica,63 wherein the Court argued the
Carlin monologue at issue was a low value category of speech and of
"slight social value as a step to truth. 64 Combining this logic with the
broadcast as a special medium argument, the FCC concludes that regulation
of violent programming on broadcast television would be subject to
"reduced First Amendment protection. 65
Yet, even the FCC's analysis concedes that any such regulation would
have to be narrowly tailored in furtherance of the purported governmental
goal of protecting children from so-called harmful content.66 The FCC
preempts arguments regarding the technological options now available to
58. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 12 23 & 25.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12 24.
61. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 574-79 (drawing a distinction between "sexually graphic expression" and "a
child's world of violent adventures" in holding that the First Amendment was violated).
63. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
64. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 12 25 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.)
65. Id. at 12 25.
66. Id. at 12 26.
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parents to help block out content they do not wish their children to see.
Specifically, the FCC argues that these measures may impose lesser
burdens than a channeling regulation, but the FCC is "skeptical that they
will fully serve the government's interests in promoting parental
supervision and protecting the well-being of minors. 68
1. Standard of Scrutiny
There are many notable items in the FCC's legal analysis. First, it is
no longer entirely clear that the Supreme Court and lower courts, in
addressing broadcast content regulations, are specifically applying an
intermediate standard of scrutiny versus a strict standard of scrutiny.
Language from previous Supreme Court cases on broadcast regulation has
relied on the notion that the broadcast medium receives somewhat less
protection under First Amendment analysis than other mediums.
69
However, those precedents alternatively relied on the scarcity rationale7° or
the justifications set forth in Pacifica.71 According to some commentators,
both the technological underpinnings and theoretical coherence of the
scarcity rationale have been under attack recently.72 The courts are
reluctant to apply the doctrine to more recent cases and are avoiding
extending it to other mediums.73 Furthermore, the scarcity rationale has no
bearing on regulating indecency, nor would it likely be the rationale behind
regulating violent content. Instead, Pacifica's defense of indecency
regulations would most likely provide the legal basis for such regulation-
the attributes of broadcast with respect to its pervasiveness in the home and
67. With the increasing availability of technology that enables parents to block undesirable
content the need to regulate such content from its source is lessened--or at the very least this
technological alternative is a less restrictive means for protecting minors. See, e.g., Christopher
S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91
GEO. L.J. 245, 304 (2003).
68. Id.; In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra
note 1 at 12 26.
69. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 12 22-25.
70. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (setting forth the scarcity
rationale and examining whether the FCC's fairness doctrine violated broadcasters' First
Amendment rights). In upholding the doctrine, the Court in part reasoned that broadcast
frequencies were scarce and without governmental assistance many in the public would be unable
to gain access to those frequencies to express their viewpoints.
71. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 67 at 283-84 (arguing the scarcity doctrine is implicitly
collapsing).
73. See, e.g., id. at 253-54.
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unique accessibility to children.74 There is little consensus on the test that
the Supreme Court in Pacifica applied to the indecency regulations.
One need only examine the various opinions in Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC75 to see this
uncertainty on full display. Justice Breyer's plurality opinion in Denver
Area found that the Court need not determine what standard of scrutiny the
Court applied in Pacifica because either way, the provision being addressed
in Denver Area did not pass either the Court's strictest or somewhat less
76strict requirements.
Additionally, Justice Souter's concurring opinion noted that the Court
in Pacifica had failed to assign a specific level of scrutiny for reviewing the
indecency regulations addressed in the case.77  Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Denver Area found that the Pacifica decision relied
on a rule that broadcasting had received the most limited First Amendment
protection of any medium.78  At the same time, Justice Kennedy
specifically rejected any notion that indecent speech itself was subject to a
lower standard of review.79
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Action for Children's
Television v. FCC ("ACT Ii/,) 80 further demonstrates how appellate courts
have applied the strict scrutiny standard test to analyze content regulations
in broadcast media. In ACT Ill, the D.C. Circuit was explicit about the
standard it applied in analyzing the revised and more constricted safe
harbor hours for indecent speech on broadcast television. The court
applied the strict scrutiny standard in analyzing the regulation which
changed the safe harbor hours. However, the court stated, "[w]hile we
apply strict scrutiny to regulations of this kind regardless of the medium
affected by them, our assessment of whether section 16(a) survives that
scrutiny must necessarily take into account the unique context of the
74. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
75. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 727-32 (1996)
(examining three sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992. The three sections were challenged on First Amendment grounds. The sections allowed
leased and public access channels to prohibit sexually explicit programming, while another
provision required leased channels to segregate sexually explicit programming into a single
channel).
76. Id. at 755.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 803.
79. Id. at 803-04 ("Pacifica did not purport, however, to apply a special standard for
indecent broadcasting.").
80. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(examining whether section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, which restricts
the safe harbor hours during which indecent material could be broadcast, was constitutional).
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broadcast medium.",
8'
The FCC Report's legal analysis on this point is at best misleading.
In fact, courts apply a strict scrutiny analysis to content based regulations in
the broadcast arena, albeit a slightly modified strict scrutiny analysis that
takes into account the unique history of the broadcast medium.82 Even with
this modification, the language used is unmistakable: the government must
demonstrate a compelling government interest, and the means used to
further that interest must be narrowly tailored. The modification for the
broadcast medium does not seem to be applied when asking which standard
of scrutiny to use, but instead it is used in analyzing the strict scrutiny test
itself. It is disingenuous for the FCC to state in its Report that strict
scrutiny will not be applied8 3 and, therefore, content based regulations of
violence on television are constitutional.
2. Speech Valuations
Another interesting assertion made in the FCC's Report is the
approval of the concept of "low value" speech categories.84 The FCC
makes this pronouncement relying heavily on Justice Stevens' opinion
from Pacifica where in Part IV(B), he argues that the Carlin monologue in
question has limited "social value," noting "it is undisputed that the content
of... [the] broadcast was 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and shocking." 85 Further,
Justice Stevens argued that the words used by Carlin in the monologue
"offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. 86
As is well known by those who are familiar with the Pacifica case,
this part of Justice Stevens' opinion garnered only three votes. 87 In fact,
Justices Powell and Blackmun issued a concurring opinion, in part to
specifically note their disagreement with Justice Stevens' contentions in
Part IV-B of his opinion, which states:
I do not join Part IV-B, however, because I do not subscribe to
the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to
decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the
First Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the
81. Id. at 660.
82. See generally id. (referring to precedent that discusses various levels of scrutiny).
83. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 21.
84. Id. at 12 25.
85. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
86. Id. at 746.
87. Yoo, supra note 67 at 297.
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most protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence
deserving of less protection .... In my view, the result in this
case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a
whole, or the words that constitute it, have more or less "value"
than a candidate's campaign speech. This is a judgment for each
person to make, not one for the judges to impose upon him.
88
Interestingly, according to one legal scholar, it was only after Justice
Stevens failed to assemble a majority on his low value argument that he
turned to the medium specific logic found in Part IV-C, which became the
lasting impression of the Pacifica case.89
III. MISSING THE MARK
Still, the most troubling aspect of the FCC's legal analysis is its
failure to fully explore and recognize that the content it proposes to
regulate is entirely different from indecency. The FCC relies heavily on a
medium-specific analysis, with little concern for the difference in the
content proposed to be regulated.90 A loose analogy can be drawn from the
FCC's medium-centric analysis to Marshall McLuhan's famous assertion
that the "medium is the message." 91
In his book, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man,
92
McLuhan set forth his theory regarding the importance of understanding
communication technologies in the context of broader societal impacts and
in the context of those technologies that preceded them.93  McLuhan
claimed that communication and other technologies shape society, our
experiences, and the way we conceptualize and act-regardless of what a
medium's actual content might be. 94  McLuhan deemphasized the
importance of the given message's content and instead focused on the
characteristics of the medium.95 Similarly, the FCC appears to be latching
onto the importance of the medium-broadcast television-at the expense
of paying attention to the content to be regulated-violence. Some may
find McLuhan useful for analyzing the relationship between technology
88. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761.
89. Yoo, supra note 67 at 297.
90. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 22.
91. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (MIT
Press 1994) (1964).
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 8.
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and society. However, this framework does not translate well into First
Amendment case law analysis, where the type of content that is regulated is
relevant and cannot be ignored.
The FCC Report's only reference to the difference in regulated
content is a reference to Pappas Telecasting Companies' public comments
submission.96 These comments simply note that Pappas believes the
protected interests are the same whether the regulations restrict indecency
or violence.97 However, no mention is made of what these interests are, or
explicitly what legal authority Pappas is relying on in its comments.98
Moreover, the FCC's reliance on such sparse reasoning is surprising,
especially given the existing case law examining violent media, which on
the whole seems to indicate a distinctly different treatment of violence
versus indecency. 99
The question regarding the difference in the content is distilled down
to the question Pappas Telecasting addressed (albeit briefly) in its
comments-are the reasons behind regulating violent content similar to
those for regulating indecency?100 The answer to this question is highly
relevant to whether a court accepts the interest advanced by the government
as compelling (assuming, as previously discussed, the court applies a strict
scrutiny analysis in examining the regulation).
Answering this question is not clear cut, given the varying interests
that are stated for regulating both indecency and violent material. Several
consistent themes emerge after examining several cases that analyze
attempts to regulate both kinds of content. As will be discussed, these
cases demonstrate that the motivations for regulating indecency and violent
content differ and consequently should affect whether violent content
regulations are upheld-regardless of the medium.
One only needs to examine Justice Stevens' opinion in Pacifica to see
that several of the main concerns regarding indecency regulation stem from
the need to protect children from offensive speech, rather than concern for
a measurable psychological harm to minors.101  According to Justice
Stevens, the Carlin monologue at issue in Pacifica "offend[s] for the same
96. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra note
1 at 12 25.
97. Id. at 12 24.
98. Id. at 12 25.
99. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
100. In the Matter of Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, supra
note 1 at 12 24.
101. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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reasons that obscenity offends." 10 2 Stevens specifically equates indecency
with obscenity and further reasons that such speech has slight social value,
and any benefit it has "is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' 0 3 Finally, Justice Stevens concluded "it is undisputed that
the content of Pacifica's broadcast was 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and
'shocking."", 10 4
Justice Powell's concurring opinion hews to some of these same
themes, even though more broadly; his opinion refused to classify the
monologue as "low value" speech.105 Justice Powell's opinion notes that
most people would find the Carlin monologue "vulgar and offensive."10 6 In
fact, Justice Powell concludes that this kind of "verbal shock treatment" is
"'patently offensive' to most people regardless of age."10 7 Furthermore, in
describing the concern with protecting children from this sort of speech,
Justice Powell states society has a "right to protect its children from speech
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years," and an interest in
ensuring "unwilling adults [are not] assaulted by such offensive speech."
10 8
It seems clear that the majority's focus in Pacifica with respect to the
Carlin monologue was not that the broadcast caused specific psychological
harm to children who might hear it, or that it would necessarily have a
specific negative effect on society. 109 Instead, the majority justices seemed
to rely on an overall concern that listeners, including children, would be
offended by such vulgar and offensive speech. 10 Certainly, the majority
relied heavily on the proposition that such offensive speech is subject to
more regulation in the broadcast medium because it assaults people in their
homes and is uniquely accessible to children, but the content of the speech
clearly mattered as well."'
Similarly, examining the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
ACT III demonstrates a heavy reliance on the type of content being
regulated. In ACT III, the court was examining whether a revision of the
102. Id. at 746.
103. Id. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
104. Id. at 747.
105. Id. at 761 (noting the Justices of the Court were not free to decide, on the basis of
content, which speech was more valuable and more deserving of protection and which speech was
less valuable and less deserving of protection).
106. Id. at 757.
107. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757.
108. Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
109. See id. at 750 (noting that the court seemed to be more concerned with the case where
children may obtain access to broadcast material).
110. Id. at 748-49.
111. Id. at 748.
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broadcast indecency safe harbor hours from the original ten p.m. to six a.m.
regulation to a new and more restrictive twelve a.m. to six a.m. time frame
should be upheld.' 12 The court considered petitioners' arguments that the
constriction of the safe harbor hours violated the broadcasters' First
Amendment rights.1 13 Although the court applied a strict scrutiny standard
to the statute restricting the safe harbor hours, the court noted in its
application it would take into consideration that broadcasting had
historically received the most limited First Amendment protection of any
medium."14
The government put forth three interests it deemed compelling
enough to support the statute's constitutionality: "support for parental
supervision of children, a concern for children's well-being, and the
protection of the home against intrusion by offensive broadcasts."'1 5 The
D.C. Circuit found the first two interests persuasive, so it did not consider
the third interest.' 16
The government's second interest, concern for children's well-being,
demonstrates the importance of content in the court's analysis. The
petitioners in ACT III argued that while the government has an interest in
children's well-being, the government could not prove any causal nexus
between the indecent material being regulated and harm to minors."
17
However, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that "the Supreme Court has never
suggested that a scientific demonstration of psychological harm is required
in order to establish the constitutionality of measures protecting minors
from exposure to indecent speech."
'"18
While this may seem to bolster the case of those who support violence
regulations, the language used by the D.C. Circuit is limited to indecent
speech." 9 After making the above-referenced statement, the court cites
Ginsberg v. New York 120 for further support that a causal link between harm
and the regulated material is not needed to uphold legislation aimed at
protecting children from certain material.12' The Ginsberg case dealt
112. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
113. Id. at 659.
114. Id. at 660 (noting that "radio and television broadcasts may be subject to different-
and often more restrictive-regulation than is permissible for other media under the First
Amendment.").
115. Id. at 660-61.
116. Id. at 661.
117. Id.
118. Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 661-62.
119. Id. at 663.
120. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121. Actionfor Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 662.
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specifically with limiting the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors that
appealed to "the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors" and were
"patently offensive to prevailing standards."' 122 In Ginsberg, the Supreme
Court's reasoning depended heavily on the concept of a "variable
obscenity" test for minors. 123 This rationale informs the remainder of the
Court's analysis in Ginsberg, including its conclusion that the Legislature
need not provide evidence constituting scientific fact that such material is
harmful to minors. 24 It was enough for the Court in Ginsberg that the
Legislature had a rational basis for such a finding12 5 -- clearly a far different
standard than strict scrutiny requires. The Court in Ginsberg specifically
bracketed the variable obscenity statute for minors with obscenity itself,
thus lessening the burden the government must meet in order to defend the
statute. 126
Beyond a reliance on Ginsberg, which was clearly focused on the
sexual nature of the content being regulated, the D.C. Circuit's decision in
ACT III placed a heavy reliance on the content and context of the speech
being regulated under the proposed safe harbor scheme. 27 Again noting
that there is no need for specific scientific evidence, the court reasoned that
"Congress does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists
in order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable minds that can
result from a persistent exposure to sexually explicit material just this side
of legal obscenity."' 128 Furthermore, the court referenced the fact that most
states also prohibit minors from accessing sexually explicit material.
2 9
Based on this "social consensus" and the Supreme Court precedent
discussed above, the ACT III court concluded that the government has a
compelling interest in shielding children from sexually explicit material
that is "not obscene by adult standards."' 30
The FCC's own definition of indecency similarly does not focus on
any specific harm that might be caused by the material. Instead, it is
122. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633-34.
123. Id. at 635-37 (focusing on variable obscenity and whether it is constitutionally
permissible for New York to judge and determine the sexual materials for themselves).
124. Id. at 641-42 (noting that the court can determine the issue even without scientific
facts).
125. Id. at 641.
126. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
127. See Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 660 (noting that because broadcast
audiences have no choice in being confronted with offensive material, they are subject to more
restrictive regulations).
128. Id. at 662.
129. Id. at 663.
130. Id. (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
18 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1
concerned with offensiveness-"language or material that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or
excretory activities or organs."'13 1 In fact, according to the FCC's 2001
Industry Guideline on its indecency enforcement policies, the FCC must
make two findings before broadcasted material is deemed indecent:
"[f]irst, the material.., must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs
or activities," and "[s]econd, the broadcast must be patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards.' 32
In contrast to the indecency and sexually explicit material cases,
which focus on the material's offensiveness, are those cases addressing
attempts to regulate violent content. 33  The most recent and prominent
examples of such attempts arise in the area of violent video games. While
the medium is different, the focus in these cases is on what motivates
regulators to restrict violent content, which seems to be the determining
factor. 134
Of course, one of the best known decisions on attempts to regulate
violent video games is American Amusement Machine v. Kendrick.
135
Many subsequent cases and law review articles on the issue have cited
Judge Posner's decision in American Amusement.1 36 Of importance to the
medium versus message question is Judge Posner's discussion of the
varying rationales the government provides for regulating sexually explicit
material as opposed to violent material.1
37
131. In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 2 4
(2001).
132. Id. at 4 7-8 (emphasis added).
133. See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass'n. v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954
(8th Cir. 2003); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash.
2004); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
134. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d. 954; Video Software Dealers
Ass n, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 105 1; Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d 978;
Video Software Dealers Ass 'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034.
135. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
136. See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 957; Video Software
Dealers Ass 'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1183; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1056; Granholm, 404 F.
Supp. 2d at 982; Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039; Russell Morse,
Comment, If You Fail, Try, Try Again: The Fate of New Legislation Curbing Minors' Access to
Violent and Sexually Explicit Video Games, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171, 172 (2006); Clay
Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of Kids'
Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
137. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass 'n, 244 F.3d at 573.
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In American Amusement, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered an Indianapolis ordinance that limited minors' access to video
arcade games that the ordinance defined as harmful to minors.'38 The
definition included games that appealed not only to the minors' prurient
interests in sex, but also to the minors' interest in violence. 139  Both
categories (sex and violence) had to be "patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen (18) years" and had
to contain either graphic violence or strong sexual content. 40  The
ordinance defined graphic violence as the "visual depiction or
representation of realistic serious injury to a human or human-like being
where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation,
dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration."' 4' The
game manufacturers challenged the ordinance's limitation only with
respect to the graphic violence provision. 1
42
Judge Posner determined that despite the intersections between the
reasons for regulating obscenity and violence, "in general the concerns are
different.'
' 43
The main worry about obscenity, the main reason for its
proscription, is not that it is harmful, which is the worry behind
the Indianapolis ordinance, but that it is offensive. A work is
classified as obscene ... upon proof that it violates community
norms regarding the permissible scope of depictions of sexual or
sex-related activity .... Obscenity is to many people disgusting,
embarrassing, degrading, disturbing, outrageous, and insulting,
but it generally is not believed to inflict temporal (as distinct
from spiritual) harm; or at least the evidence that it does is not
generally considered as persuasive as the evidence that other
speech that can be regulated on the basis of its content, such as
threats of physical harm, conspiratorial communications,
incitements, frauds, and libels and slanders, inflicts such
harm.... No proof that obscenity is harmful is required either to
defend an obscenity statute against being invalidated on
constitutional grounds or to uphold a prosecution for obscenity.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 574.
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Offensiveness is the offense.
144
Judge Posner also found a historical difference between regulating
violent content and obscenity, noting "[c]lassical literature and art, and not
merely today's popular culture, are saturated with graphic scenes of
violence, whether narrated or pictorial.' 45  Thus, "[t]he notion of
forbidding not violence itself, but pictures of violence, is a novelty,
whereas concern with pictures of graphic sexual conduct is of the essence
of the traditional concern with obscenity."'
' 46
This did not, however, end Judge Posner's inquiry. He reasoned that
protecting children from violence is as worthy a goal as protecting them
from sexually explicit content. 147  In order to do so, though, the
government's grounds "must be compelling and not merely plausible.' 48
The court believed that the city might be concerned with the welfare of and
the psychological harm to the children playing violent video games and a
more general concern that such game playing might increase violence in
society at large. 149 Judge Posner stated that the city "rightly [did] not rest
on 'what everyone knows' about the harm inflicted by violent video
games"-which he implied is what the Ginsberg Court did on the issue of
the girlie magazines.15
0
In American Amusement, the city defended its ordinance on the basis
that the "violent video games incite youthful players to breaches of the
peace. 0 5'1 To support that proposition, the city introduced two studies,
both of which found that playing violent video games tended "to make
young persons more aggressive in their attitudes and behavior.' ' 152 Judge
Posner did not find the studies to be compelling for several reasons. First,
the studies involved video games that were not similar to those in the video
arcade rooms in Indianapolis or those likely to be marketed there.' 53
Second, the studies did not show that playing violent video games "ha[d]
ever caused anyone to commit a violent act" or "caused the average level of
144. Id. at 574-75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 575.
146. Id. at 575-76.
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id. at 576.
149. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 573.
150. Id. at 578. See also id. at 579 (Judge Posner indicates that the Ginsberg decision may
in fact just be a product of its time: "Ginsberg did not insist on social scientific evidence that
quasi-obscene images are harmful to children. The Court, as we have noted, thought this a matter
of common sense. It was in 1968; it may not be today; but that is not our case.").
151. Id. at 575.
152. Id. at 574.
153. Id. at 578.
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violence to increase anywhere."'' 54  In Judge Posner's opinion, the city
could not identify anything unique about the interactivity of the video
games that made them more dangerous than other violent media to which
children were routinely exposed. 1
55
The rationale used in American Amusement has been echoed many
times by other courts, which have held that violent content cannot be
bracketed with obscenity or sexually explicit material and emphasized that
different motivations exist for regulating each. 56 The importance of the
distinction between sexually explicit material and violent content cannot be
overstated. As Judge Posner noted, the Ginsberg Court simply relied on
common sense in deciding that exposure to the girlie magazines could harm
children. 57 Furthermore, the Ginsberg Court assumed that the material fell
within a variable obscenity standard and therefore applied a deferential
rational basis standard, as opposed to a more rigorous strict scrutiny
standard that would demand a showing of a compelling state interest.158
While Ginsberg has allowed subsequent courts to take at face value the
government interest in protecting children from sexually explicit material,
this interest has not been expanded to violent content on the basis of a
common sense appeal. 5 9 Indeed, as one scholar has noted, it makes little
sense to extend Ginsberg's common-sense reasoning to other areas of
protected speech.
60
The distinction between what is motivating legislators to adopt
violence regulations versus indecency or obscenity regulations, is further
154. Id. at 578-79.
155. Am. Amusement Mach Ass 'n, 244 F.3d at 579.
156. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n, 329 F.3d. at 958 (striking down ordinance
requiring parental approval before minors can rent, buy or have access to graphically violent
video games); Video Software Dealers Ass 'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185, 1191 (granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, finding the Washington statute prohibiting minors' purchase or
rental of violent video games depicting the killing of law enforcement both under inclusive and
overbroad); Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (granting permanent injunction to plaintiffs
enjoining enforcement of Illinois law prohibiting selling or renting violent video games to
minors); Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (enjoining enforcement of Michigan law prohibiting
display of graphically violent video games to minors without parental consent); Video Software
Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs barring
enforcement of California law that prohibited the rental or sale of violent video games to minors).
157. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 579.
158. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
159. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d. at 960; Video Software Dealers
Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1191; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d
at 983; Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
160. See Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REv. 565, 612-13
(2005) ("The Court would better serve First Amendment interests by insisting upon some
empirical evidence of harm from sexual speech, just as it should do with other areas of speech.").
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demonstrated in a 2004 report from the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation.' 6' The committee report analyzed the
possibility of prohibiting the broadcast of violent material when children
compose a "substantial portion of the audience."'162  In doing so, the
committee's report noted that strict scrutiny is the likely constitutional test
that would be applied, which would at least require that the government
have a compelling government interest to justify regulation. 63 The report
noted four such interests: moderating the harmful effect broadcasting has
on children, minimizing the harmful effect on society, helping parents
supervise their children, and supporting the privacy of the home from
intruding violent content. 1
64
The first stated interest is a concern regarding the harm violent
broadcasting has on children. 65 Noting various studies on the issue, the
report indicates that violent material can have many harmful effects on
children, including anti-social behavior, increased violent behavior,
becoming distant from others, being unproductive members of society,
fearfulness, de-sensitization, and an increased desire for more violence. 1
66
This first interest stems from a completely different rationale from
that supporting the regulation of sexually explicit material. Typically, the
concern with sexually explicit material is the offensiveness, rather than a
measurable psychological harm.167  If the governmental interest in
regulating violence specifically focuses on eradicating harm to children, the
regulations will likely encounter the same problems that regulation
agencies have faced when attempting to restrict minors' access to violent
video games. The proponents of regulation will need to show that the harm
is real. This was the problem that the regulators had in American
Amusement Machine, where Judge Posner concluded the studies did not
demonstrate that playing violent video games caused children to commit
crimes.1 68 If this "real harm" standard continues to be used (and as noted
earlier, it has been used in subsequent cases in violent video game
situations), it will be very difficult for the government to establish harm to
161. See S. REP. NO. 108-253 (2004).
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 14.
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 15.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Compare S. REP. No. 108-253, at 15 (2004) (justifying regulation of television
violence by citing adverse psychological affects in children), with Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633
(affirming conviction for selling pornography to a minor because it was offensive and not suitable
for minors).
168. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 578-79.
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children as a compelling government interest. Again, the distinction
between harm to children in the violence arena versus the sexually explicit
material cases, is that the courts take for granted that it is inappropriate for
children to be exposed to sexually explicit material. This was evident from
the ruling in Ginsberg wherein the Court considered the harm to minors
argument as a matter of common sense.' 69 It appears unlikely that this
default to common sense will be replicated in the area of violent material,
given that the regulating agencies continue to rely on social science studies
to prove the harm, as opposed to "what everyone knows."'
' 70
The committee cites harm to society as a second concern stemming
from children's exposure to the broadcasting of violent content., 71 The
report notes that while the government needs to protect children from the
potential effect of violent content, the government may also need to protect
society from the detrimental effects these now more-violent children may
have on society. 72 This concern has the same potential problems as the
interest of harm to children. Subsequently, when the government is
suggesting a solution to a specifically measurable problem, they will need
to show that violence actually caused the problem. 
73
The third interest listed in the Report is the need to help parents
supervise their children. 174 This interest was recognized in the Ginsberg
case and other courts have cited it with approval. 75 However, this interest
rests on the assumption that the general public believes that questionable
material is inappropriate for minors. When it comes to sexually explicit
material, the courts have been willing to accept at face value that such
material is inappropriate or harmful for minors, but the application of this
axiomatic reasoning to violent content has not been forthcoming. 76 Thus,
it seems the regulators would need to show that there is a reason to support
parental supervision concerns on this issue, lest the FCC censors a whole
slew of topics in the name of supporting parents' wishes.
169. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
170. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 578.
171. S. REP. NO. 108-253, at 15 (2004).
172. Id. at 9.
173. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 576 (noting that the city needed to show
it had grounds for believing the games caused harm to children and that such grounds had to be
compelling not merely plausible).
174. S. REP. No. 108-253, at 16 (2004).
175. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997); Action for Children's Television,
58 F.3d at 679.
176. See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d. 954; Video Software
Dealers Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051; Granholm, 404 F.
Supp. 2d 978; Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034.
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The last interest included in the committee's report is the
governmental concern for protecting the home from intrusive violent
content. 7 In support of the sanctity of the home theory, the report cites a
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which upheld a prohibition against
automated telephone calls to homes and businesses.178 Of course, there is a
distinct difference between automated, unsolicited telephone calls to homes
and the content delivered via a television set where a homeowner
voluntarily tunes into a channel programmed by a particular broadcaster.
The analogy made by the committee's report is simply inapt. The report
also relies on the majority's reasoning in Pacifca,17 9 which in turn relied
heavily on television's "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans... [which] confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."' 80  However,
according to the Pacifica Court, citizens have the right to be free from
"patently offensive, indecent material" which confronts the citizen without
warning. 8  As noted throughout, this "offensiveness" rationale does not
seem to be applicable in the violent content analysis and further expansion
of this reasoning would certainly lead to unprecedented and unsupported
censorship of the broadcast airwaves.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCC Report was supposed to provide Congress guidance on an
issue of great importance to many. Unfortunately, the Report fails to
substantively address the questions posed by the House members in any
great detail. Although the Report provides conclusions, they are supported
by superficial and often inaccurate reasoning. These flaws permeate the
Report on every question posed by the House members, but the most
glaring defect from a legal perspective is the FCC's failure to account for
the distinct effect regulating violent content will have on a constitutional
analysis of any broadcast violence regulation.
It is of no small importance that the body charged with overseeing the
broadcast medium has issued a report concluding that Congress may
constitutionally regulate broadcast television violence. Congress may very
well rely upon the FCC's expertise to introduce and possibly pass
177. S. REP. No. 108-253, at 16 (2004).
178. Id. at 16 (2004) (citing Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995)).
179. See S. REP. NO. 108-253, at 16 (2004).
180. Pacfica Found., 438 U.S. at 748.
181. Id.
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legislation in accordance with the Report. Even if Congress ultimately
does not pass any legislation, it sends a strong message to broadcasters that
the possibility is still there, conceivably encouraging programmers to
engage in self-censorship to avoid future legislative action. Given the
implications, the Report's flaws seem even more unacceptable.

